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How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of
agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual
identiﬁcation and which is immune to error through misidentiﬁcation. However, the neuroscience of action
and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of speciﬁc cognitive processes underlying the
sense of agency—the ‘‘Who’’ system (Georgieﬀ & Jeannerod, 1998)—which is disrupted in delusions of
control (Frith, 1992). Yet, we have to be careful in the interpretation of such clinical symptoms, which
cannot be so easily reduced to deﬁcit of action monitoring or to lack of action awareness. Moreover, we
should reﬁne the deﬁnition of the sense of agency by distinguishing the sense of initiation and the sense of
ones own movements. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to establish the taxonomy of
the diﬀerent levels of action representations.
 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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How can I know myself? The self is elusive and always seems to escape from introspection. As
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consciousness of this bundle of perceptions. In other words, how do I recognize my mental and
bodily states as mine? For instance, when I am aware that I am running I am conscious of: (1) the
action of running and (2) the person who is running, that is, me. Well suggest here that these two
aspects are distinct and that the sense of agency—deﬁned as the ability to refer to oneself as the
author of ones own actions—depends on speciﬁc cognitive and neural processes that need to be
investigated. The notion of self involved here is primitive and we will not address the metaphysical
question of its nature, its reality or its ﬁctional character. Rather, we intend to sketch the cognitive
conditions underlying the sense of agency by integrating the recent empirical data of neuroscience
and neuropsychology and the conceptual analysis of philosophy.2. ‘‘I-thoughts’’
I have a car, Im tall, I move my arm, Im thinking, I feel angry. . . I can self-ascribe a quasi-
inﬁnite list of predicates. What is common to all these propositions (or I-thoughts) is the subject
to whom the properties are attributed, the reference of ‘‘I’’. However, the presence of the ﬁrst
person concept is not suﬃcient to make this category of I-thoughts homogeneous. Indeed, they do
not have the same causal history nor do they have the same epistemic status.
2.1. Two kinds of I-thoughts
I see a tree. But how do I know that I am the person who sees the tree? Shoemaker (1963)
asked. When Jones sees a tree, the fact that I see Jones seeing the tree justiﬁes my conclusion that
he is the person who sees the tree. However, it would be nonsensical to suggest that similarly I see
myself seeing the tree. I do not need either to know who I am to recognize this visual experience as
mine. Self-attributions of occurring mental states do not use criteria of personal identity: Even if I
am an amnesiac, I know that I see a tree. Consequently, this kind of I-thoughts does not depend
on any perceptual or semantic identiﬁcation of the subject. On the contrary, other I-thoughts
require identifying myself as the person who is described. In this latter case, I cannot assert, ‘‘I am
F.V.’’ if I have no information about myself. Similarly, in order to recognize myself in the mirror,
I need to identify the person that I am looking at as myself. The distinction between these two
types of I-thoughts does not arise from the kind of property ascribed (for instance, mental versus
bodily properties), but rather from the way of gaining self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). Thus, the
very same property can be self-attributed following diﬀerent ways of knowing: Some depend on
the identiﬁcation of the subject whereas others are identiﬁcation-free.
For instance, bodily self-knowledge may be based on visual information (‘‘I see my arm rais-
ing’’) or on proprioceptive information (‘‘I feel my arm raising’’). The former case involves a prior
visual identiﬁcation (‘‘The arm that I see is mine’’). As I can see my own body as well as the body
of other people, I need to distinguish them. On the contrary, the latter case is identiﬁcation-free
and directly relies on my proprioceptive system. As I cannot receive any proprioceptive infor-
mation about someone elses body, I am assured that the source of the information is my own
body (Evans, 1982). Consequently, proprioceptive self-ascriptions do not depend on the identi-
ﬁcation of the body as ones own, unlike visual self-ascriptions of bodily properties. Following
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ﬁrst person used as object:There are two diﬀerent cases in the use of the word I (or my) which I might call the
use as object and the use as subject (. . .). The cases of the ﬁrst category involve the
recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error
(. . .). On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have
a toothache. To ask are you sure that its you who have pains?’’ would be nonsensical.Identiﬁcation implies ipso facto the possibility of misidentiﬁcation: I may wrongly believe that
I am the person in the mirror, when it is actually my twin. On the contrary, the I-thoughts that are
identiﬁcation-free are said to be ‘‘immune to error through misidentiﬁcation’’ (Shoemaker, 1994):
I cannot believe that I am thinking while it is actually someone else who is thinking. Nonetheless,
I may still falsely believe that I am thinking while I am actually sleeping. We need here to dis-
tinguish two kinds of errors in self-knowledge: At the level of the self-ascribed property (‘‘I have
blond hair,’’ while I am actually dark-haired) and at the level of the subject to whom the property is
ascribed (‘‘My stomach is groaning,’’ while it is actually my neighbors one). The principle of
immunity to error concerns only the level of the subject. It assumes that the asymmetry between the
knowledge of ones own mind and the knowledge of other minds is such that one could never
confuse ones own thoughts with someone elses thoughts. For instance, as soon as I know the
bodily property on the basis of internal information such as proprioception, I would be assured
that the body that I feel is mine. Similarly, I would have a privileged access to my own actions that I
do not have for the actions performed by other people. Thus, as soon as I know the action from the
ﬁrst person perspective of the agent, I would be assured that I am the person who is moving.
2.2. The fallibility of self-attribution
However, we have to make a distinction between the fact that I own a certain state—mental or
bodily—and the fact that I recognize this state as mine. Roughly, we should not conﬂate the
objective relation of belonging and the epistemic relation of self-attribution. For instance, patients
suﬀering from asomatognosia following a right parietal lesion deny the ownership of their limb
controlateral to the brain lesion and attribute the alien hand to someone else or personify it, as in
the following example (Bisiach, Rusconi, & Vallar, 1991, p. 1030):
Examiner: Whose arm is this?
A.R.: Its not mine.
Ex: Whose is it?
A.R.: Its my mothers.
Ex: How on earth does it happen to be there?
A.R.: I dont know. I found it in my bed.
Ex: How long has it been there?
A.R.: Since the ﬁrst day. Feel, its warmer than mine. The other day too, when the weather was
colder, it was warmer than mine.
Ex: So, where is your left arm?
A.R.: Its under there (indeﬁnite gesture forwards)
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independent from sensory deﬁcits: A patient may scream when her alien hand is squeezed, but
still denies that this hand belongs to her (Melzack, 1992). Similarly, Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, and
Vallar (2002) described the case of F.B., a patient who attributed her hand to her niece. She was
able to report a tactile sensation only if she was previously warned that her nieces hand was going
to be touched. The authors concluded that somatosensory representations do not suﬃce for
recognizing a body part as ones own. We may then wonder about the nature of the cognitive
conditions of the sense of ownership of ones own body.
Consequently, far from being absolute, the immunity to error is only circumstantial because it
depends on the reliability of the way of gaining self-knowledge (Evans, 1982). In other words, the
fact that some I-thoughts do not depend on any identiﬁcation does not imply that they do not
depend on any causal process, which can be fallible. This conclusion is valid not only for the sense
of ownership, but also for the sense of agency of ones own actions. Well see in the next part that
the border between the self and the other is sometimes so dim that one can misattribute ones own
actions to someone else and vice-versa. I may indeed mistakenly believe that my arm is moving
because I perceive an arm in movement. Action misattribution would thus result from body
misattribution. However, we should not reduce the sense of agency to the sense of ownership of
ones own body despite the wide importance of their interactions (Gallagher, 2000). An action is
not only perceived, it is also initiated, controlled and inhibited. We have thus to take into account
the dimension of the agent who is the cause of the action. In this sense, I may indeed not be the
agent of all my bodily movements like in passive movements when for instance someone else raises
my arm for me. It is only in a derivative sense that passive movements are mine because all I
own in theses cases is the moving body. Therefore, we can raise the following question: what
must be added to the neutral state (‘‘Performed action’’) to be able to self-ascribe it (‘‘I am
moving’’)?
In summary, we have two diﬀerent kinds of I-thoughts using diﬀerent notions of the self. When
I recognize the action of grasping a glass as my own, the sense of agency involves the notion of a
‘‘minimal self’’ (Gallagher, 2000), which is instantaneous and which carries only one bit of in-
formation about myself, that is, that I am grasping a glass. On the contrary, the knowledge that I
am the person in the mirror depends on recognitional criteria that allow me to reidentify myself
through time. The notion of the ‘‘recognitional self’’ has a richer content and may even constitute
personal identity. In this paper, we do not intend to address the whole issue of I-thoughts, but
only to focus on the minimal self involved in agency. In other words, how am I aware that I am
the agent who is moving?3. A neurocognitive model of action consciousness and agency
The sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely
on any prior perceptual identiﬁcation and which is immune to error through misidentiﬁcation.
However, we are going to see that the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of
schizophrenia show the existence of speciﬁc cognitive processes underlying the sense of agen-
cy—the ‘‘Who’’ system (Georgieﬀ & Jeannerod, 1998)—which would be disrupted in delusions of
control (Frith, 1992).
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itoring an action performed by someone else is never far from being also the agent of
that action. (Jeannerod, forthcoming)Following frontal lesions, some patients automatically execute the action performed by
someone else that they are observing, losing track of the distinction between their own intentions
and the intentions of others (Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986). More generally, imitation
constitutes a ‘‘bridge’’ that carries interpersonal information and plays a major role in the in-
teraction between people starting from birth. For instance, neonates are able to imitate ﬁnger
movements and facial expressions such as tongue protrusion (Meltzoﬀ & Moore, 1995). In this
latter case, the infant has to match visual information about someone else and proprioceptive
information about himself. Thus, imitation implies ‘‘innate mappings from self to others’’
(Gopnik & Meltzoﬀ, 1994, p. 168) and can be understood only if we postulate the existence of
shared representations of action between the imitator and its target. Rather than focusing on the
gap between self and others, we should thus emphasize their commonality (Gallese, 2001).
Diﬀerent ‘‘mirror matching mechanisms’’ have been found in monkeys as well as in humans.
The same cortical areas—or neurons—are activated during observation of other peoples actions
and execution of ones own actions (Davidson, 1980; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi,
1996): the supplementary motor area, the dorsal premotor cortex, the supramarginal gyrus, and
the superior parietal lobe. In other words, performing an action and observing it are neutral with
respect to the agent given that they both activate the same internal motor representation. The fact
that action representations are shared in terms of cortical activation is intimately related to the
question of agency and raises—as much for the philosopher as for the neurophysiologist—a basic
problem that one cannot elude: how can the subject discriminate between internal and external
sources of the activated representation?
The shared representations of action are called ‘‘pragmatic’’ (Jeannerod, 1994). They encode
the properties of the motor system for optimization of action execution, as well as the properties
of the object relevant for the interaction between the agent and the object. Thus, they do not
involve the semantic description of the object, of the body and of the movement from a third
person perspective; rather they represent actions from the ﬁrst-person point of view of the agent in
interaction with the world. Nonetheless, ﬁrst-person perspective does not imply that the agent of
the action is oneself. Indeed, the activation of shared representations does not suﬃce by itself to
determine who is moving, because their content does not specify the agent. It does not mean that
there is no room for the parameter of the agent. By deﬁnition, an action involves an agent per-
forming that action, but we may suggest that the parameter of the agent is left indeterminate at
this primary level (‘‘x is moving’’). Thats why we need an additional mechanism that enables us to
fulﬁll the parameter and to self-attribute our own actions: the ‘‘Who’’ system (Georgieﬀ &
Jeannerod, 1998).
This mechanism is most of the time reliable and we usually know without ambiguity who the
agent is even in complex situations like mutual imitation. However, it is not infallible: one may
mistake ones own actions for those of other people and conversely. First, as well see, its sensi-
tivity is limited even in normal subjects and it is possible to self-attribute movements that are
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such mechanism involves the possibility of its breakdown, as it is the case in positive symptoms of
schizophrenia. During verbal hallucination, schizophrenic people are talking to themselves but
they are unaware of doing so. Similarly, in delusions of control may believe that they control the
actions performed by someone else or that their own actions are inﬂuenced by the will of other
people. For example, in the alien hand task, Franck et al. (2001) showed that schizophrenic
patients suﬀer from diﬃculties correctly attributing the movement that they see: subjects were
required to execute hand movements, while the visual feedback they received about the movement
was systematically manipulated. A video monitor presented a virtual hand accomplishing either
the movement they have made or a movement manipulated by the examiner who introduced an
angular or a temporal bias. They were asked whether the movement shown on the screen was their
own or not. The results showed that when they were given a weakly biased visual feedback,
patients with positive symptoms replied randomly till 300 ms of delay and 30 of angular devi-
ation.1 Action misattributions are also displayed by apraxic patients (Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-
Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999)2 and by patients suﬀering from the anarchic hand sign
following a lesion in the medial frontal cortex or the corpus callosum (Marchetti & Della Salla,
1998). In this latter case, patients do not feel that they are initiating or controlling the movements
of their anarchic limb, which are frequently at cross-purposes with their verbally stated intentions.
All these behaviors might correspond to the disruption of attribution processing. This kind of
error seems to be an exaggeration in pathological conditions of what is observed in normal
people. In the alien hand task, Franck et al. (2001) revealed indeed that healthy subjects mis-
takenly self-attributed movements presented with a delay of 150 ms or a bias of 15. Do all these
errors result from the same failure of a single process? Nothing is less sure. Nevertheless, they
show the necessity to assume the existence of one or more cerebral mechanisms that distinguish
oneself from the other.
We have brieﬂy described the existence of action representations that do not diﬀerentiate be-
tween the self and the other. This primary ‘‘neutrality’’ implies the necessity of a speciﬁc causal
process that disambiguates action representations by articulating who the agent is and that may
lead to errors of self-attribution. Therefore, the sense of agency does not result from a constitutive
relation between the motor representation from a ﬁrst person point of view and its self-attribu-
tion, but relies on a speciﬁc process that needs to be investigated. A theory of action attribution
will have to describe which signals are mainly used by the ‘‘Who’’ system and whether they need
to be conscious.
3.2. A cognitive model of agency and schizophrenia
Two kinds of information are usually available: (i) peripheral information from visual and
proprioceptive perception of the moving body and its eﬀects on the environment and (ii) more
putative central signals related to action initiation and planning (Desmurget & Grafton, 2000;1 We may notice here that these results do not challenge the principle of immunity to error, as the agency judgement
is partly based on visual information.
2 Apraxic patients showed diﬃculties performing the alien hand task and one patient even commented on her good
performance because of the neat movement presented on the screen while she had executed a clumsy one.
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‘‘eﬀerence copy’’—were independently described in 1950 by three authors, Holst, Mittelstaedt,
and Sperry. The latter showed that each time a motor command is issued to make an ocular
movement, a copy of this information is produced in parallel and sent to a monitoring system to
be compared with the sensory feedback. Then, the confrontation of these two sources of infor-
mation allows us to distinguish between the active movements and the passive movements im-
posed by the environment. By extension, Feinberg (1978) and after him Frith (1992) suggested
that this central signal represents a kind of internal labeling of our own actions and that its
disruption would explain some xenopathic experiences found in schizophrenia. Following Ma-
lenka, Angel, Hampton, and Berger (1982), Frith and Done (1989) revealed that schizophrenic
patients suﬀering from delusions of control showed diﬃculties correcting errors produced during
the execution of a movement directed toward a target in displacement without any visual feed-
back. They explained this result by the fact that schizophrenics could not consciously ‘‘read’’ the
eﬀerence copy of the motor command. Consequently, they would rely only on peripheral
information for action monitoring and self-attribution. Without the awareness of the intention,
they misattribute their own actions and interpret them by default as the result of an external
source.
Integrating the notion of internal models of action developed by computational studies
(Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995), the last version of Friths model combines two internal
processes: the inverse model simulates the execution of action and the forward model anticipates
the sensory feedback (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). The intended, the predicted and the
actual states are compared with each other. In addition, we need to postulate another matching
system that compares the diﬀerent kinds of sensory information, and more particularly visual and
proprioceptive inputs. These comparators allow reﬁning the inverse and the forward models in
case of discrepancies. They also play a major role in action attribution and the disruption of the
forward model leads to xenopathic experiences. Delusions of control result from the lack of
awareness of the predicted limb position. The patient is conscious of his intention, but not of the
sensory consequences of the action as if he had not initiated it: he is deprived of the sense of
agency.
Through Friths theory, two main hypotheses about the sense of agency appear:
1. Hypothesis of action monitoring: the sense of agency results from the control of action. Con-
sequently, delusions of control arise through a deﬁcit of action monitoring.
2. Hypothesis of action awareness: the sense of agency depends on the awareness of endogenous
information such as the intended state or the predicted state. Consequently, delusions of con-
trol result from the lack of action awareness.
However, both hypotheses raise several problems.
3.2.1. Hypothesis of action monitoring
We can wonder how far clinical symptoms are correlated to cognitive deﬁcits, and more
exactly xenopathic experiences to a failure of the forward model. If the sense of agency depends
solely on the integrity of the forward model, we should systematically ﬁnd a disruption of this
process in patients with xenopathic experiences, which does not seem to be the case. Contrary to
Friths prediction, patients with positive symptoms are not more aﬀected by errors of correction
than patients with negative symptoms (Leudar, Thomas, & Johnston, 1994). Moreover, using
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correction in the schizophrenic population than in the control one. Similarly, Trillenberg et al.
(1998) analyzed the ocular smooth pursuit response to a sinusoidally moving target that was
suddenly stopped after some cycles of regular movements: schizophrenic patients were able to
visually keep track and anticipate the target position. More recently, in a sensori-motor
adjustment task, Fourneret, Franck, Slachevsky, and Jeannerod (2001) showed that schizo-
phrenic patients, especially those suﬀering from positive symptoms, corrected an angular
perturbation in the absence of visual feedback as well as the control subjects. Therefore,
schizophrenic patients show an overall preserved ability to monitor their own actions, to predict
their sensory consequences and to compare their predictions with the intended state and the
sensory feedback (see Fig. 1).Fig. 1. Friths model. The inverse model combined with the actual sensory feedback gives rise to the estimated actual
state, which is compared to the intended state. The estimated actual state is also compared to the predicted state that
results from the forward model. Finally, the intended state is compared to the predicted state. These comparators allow
to reﬁne the inverse and the forward model in case of discrepancies. According to Frith, they also play a role in the
attribution of action (Mc, Motor commands; Ec, Eﬀerence copies).
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Rather than a deﬁcit of the forward model, delusions of control would then result from a dis-
ruption of the awareness of the predicted state. According to Frith et al. (2000), action control uses
egocentric action representations whereas the sense of agency depends on representations from a
third person point of view. Schizophrenic patients would then have diﬃculties switching the ref-
erential coordinates of actions. However, Fourneret et al. (2001) showed that most of the patients
with positive symptoms were able to report their actual strategy for compensating the bias. Thus, in
some circumstances, they could consciously monitor their actions. Moreover, the sense of agency
cannot depend on the awareness of the forward model, as most of the time we do not consciously
control our actions and we are not aware of the predicted states. On the contrary, most of our
actions are automatic and Frith et al. (2000) acknowledged that action could be monitored in the
complete lack of awareness. For instance, Castiello, Paulignan, and Jeannerod (1991) showed that
an unexpected target jump becomes available to consciousness 200 ms after the sensori-motor
adjustment. Visual representations used for action are indeed distinct from conscious represen-
tations used for identiﬁcation (Milner & Goodale, 1995). It has also been demonstrated that we
have a limited awareness of our own motor representations (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998). Most
of the time, we are only conscious of the general goal of the action and the visual feedback of the
execution, but the speciﬁc parameters of the way we have accomplished the action is unavailable to
awareness. Actions are indeed not represented in the same way at the automatic and at the con-
scious levels. At the automatic level, the succession of speciﬁc movements is described in all the
relevant details for the motor system (‘‘I stretch my arm with an angle x, a strength y and a grip
aperture w’’). However, I am not conscious of the angle of my arm, nor of the grip aperture.
Rather, I recognize a conscious global goal as mine (‘‘I grasp the glass’’). If the sense of agency
solely depended on the process of conscious motor representations, then I could self-attribute
someone elses action simply because both of our actions share the same goal, even if they do not
share the speciﬁc movements performed to reach the goal. The ‘‘Who’’ system would then not be
reliable as conscious action representations of action are not ﬁne-grained enough to disambiguate
situations such as mutual imitation. Therefore, the sense of agency arises through the processing of
unconscious signals that are ﬁne-grained enough for determining the agent in social interaction.
According to Jeannerod (forthcoming), this is one of the paradoxes of motor cognition:Whereas subjects execute actions, the content of which they remain essentially unaware,
they seem to have no problem in correctly attributing these actions to themselves or to
an external agent.Thus, we cannot assume a systematic deﬁcit of action control in schizophrenic patients; neither
can we directly relate the presence of positive symptoms solely to a speciﬁc impairment of action
awareness. Rather than postulating a complete and permanent disruption of action monitoring,
we prefer to suggest that the integrity of this system is probably overall preserved, except in
certain circumstances still to be deﬁned. Furthermore, far from feeling constantly alienated, most
of the time schizophrenic patients do correctly self-attribute their own actions and thoughts and
xenopathic experiences are only occasional. Thats why we suggest that the current challenge is in
priority to understand why action attribution episodically fails and why its deﬁciency may cor-
respond to speciﬁc semantic contents (aggressive, violent. . .). The hypothesis of contextual in-
formation processing impairments in schizophrenia oﬀers the advantage of providing an
10 F. de Vignemont, P. Fourneret / Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2004) 1–19explanation of the non-systematicy of both errors of action control and xenopathic experiences
(Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Cohen, Barch, Carter, & Servan-Schreiber, 1999; Hemsley,
1992). Several schizophrenic performance deﬁcits may be related to a central disturbance in
maintaining the internal representation of contextual information over time and in using that
information to inhibit inappropriate responses. In this theoretical framework, we may suggest
that self-attribution disorders are the result of the deﬁcit of the processing of relevant contextual
information that is necessary to disambiguate problematic social and communicative situations.3
According to Shoemakers theory of self-knowledge, the consciousness of the action should be
equivalent to its self-attribution. The gap between oneself and the other would indeed be such that
they could never be confused. However, we contend that the sense of agency does not result from
a constitutive relation between the representation of actions from a ﬁrst-person point of view and
their self-attribution, but rather relies on a speciﬁc system dedicated to action attribution. Two
intimately related kinds of empirical results tend to argue in this direction: the existence of mirror
matching systems and the possibility of errors of action attribution. First, we have seen that motor
representations are neutral in respect to the agent in the sense that one similarly represents oneself
and the other from a ﬁrst-person perspective. We are thus able to represent someone elses actions
‘‘as if they were our own’’ (Ayer, 1963) by the sharing of representations common to action and
perception. The primary lack of diﬀerentiation implies the necessity of a speciﬁc causal process
that disambiguates the representations by articulating who the agent is. Furthermore, xenopathic
experiences in schizophrenia as well as errors of action attribution in normal subjects under
ambiguous conditions reveal that we do not infallibly determine who the agent is. Even if we have
to be cautious in the interpretation of these errors, which cannot be so easily reduced to deﬁcit of
action monitoring or to lack of action awareness, they illustrate the possible disconnection be-
tween the direct consciousness of ones own actions (‘‘Someone is moving,’’ while I am moving)
and the consciousness of actions as ones own (‘‘I am moving’’). Therefore, the possibility of
errors of action attribution conﬁrms the existence of an attribution mechanism that can break-
down. Consequently, we have to acknowledge the necessity of a ‘‘Who’’ system based on the
interaction between intentions, expectations and sensory feedback. In order to investigate more
precisely its nature, we still need to reﬁne the deﬁnition of the sense of agency and to establish the
taxonomy of the diﬀerent levels of action representations.4. Toward a theory of action attribution
Through the analysis of the possible deﬁcits underlying positive symptoms in schizophrenia, we
have shown that the sense of agency cannot be reduced to action control or to action awareness
and that we need to distinguish three levels functionally independent even if intimately related
(Proust, 2000). On the one hand, the mechanisms of action monitoring are automatic, eﬃcient,
fast and anticipatory. On the other hand, the consciousness of the speciﬁc parameters of move-
ments is limited and the subject has mainly access to the content of the voluntary prior intention
and the visual feedback. We suggest that self-attribution of action is at the junction point of both3 For more details, see Bazin, Perruchet, Hardy-Bayle, and Feline (2000).
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action in order to recognize it as ours. Secondly, it does not completely merge with action
monitoring. Indeed, motor control can be understood in terms of engineering systems, but al-
though a thermostat works in the same way as the motor system, it does not self-attribute the
modiﬁcation of the surrounding temperature. Thus, action attribution constitutes an additional
dimension and takes place in the social frame of reference of shared representations between self
and others, rather than in the solipsist frame of reference of motor control (Georgieﬀ & Jeann-
erod, 1998). Nevertheless, through control and initiation, we discover ourselves as their causal
source of the executed actions.
4.1. The dual sense of agency
In the causal theory of action, as it has been defended by Decety et al. (1994), actions are
distinct from other events in virtue of their causal antecedents. The sense of agency is thus inti-
mately related with the sense of causality and satisﬁes the same kinds of criterion: Priority,
consistency and exclusivity (Michotte, 1963; Wegner, 2002). For instance, we perceive a causal
relation between the movement of two billiard balls A and B if the movement of B starts just after
the hit (criterion of priority), if the direction of the movement matches with the impulse given by
A (criterion of consistency) and if no other event can explain it (criterion of exclusivity). Similarly,
Franck et al. (2001) showed the importance of temporal priority and consistency in the experience
of agency: As we have previously said, normal subjects did not self-attribute movements visually
presented with a delay of more than 150 ms or with an angular deviation of more than 15 by
comparison with their own movements.4 Furthermore, Haggard, Aschersleben, Gehrke, and
Prinz (2002) revealed the existence of a temporal attraction of the action towards its cause.
Subjects were required to estimate the perceived time of stimuli (beeps) and of actions (key-
presses). There were strong perceptual attraction eﬀects between percepts of the two events, by
comparison to the perceived times of stimuli or actions made in isolation: The causal event in each
contingent task was perceived to occur at its normal time, whereas the consequent event was
biased towards the cause. Therefore, the awareness of the eﬀect is temporally attracted toward its
cause. According to the authors, the experience of agency results from the ‘‘intentional binding’’
between intentions, actions and sensory feedback, which are attracted toward each other, rein-
forcing the perception of their causal relations.5
Therefore, in order to understand actions, we need to analyze their causal antecedents, that
is, what initiates the occurrence of the action (‘‘why I do move, rather than doing nothing’’) and4 Blakemore, Frith, and Wolpert (1999) also emphasized the role of temporal priority in the experience of tickling.
The intensity of the tickling sensation is increased when someone else tickles us, in comparison with the felt sensation
when we tickle ourselves. If there is an artiﬁcial delay between the tactile stimulation and the self-generated movement,
the perceived intensity of the stimulation increases because the movement is attributed to someone else.
5 One of the main unresolved questions in neuroscience is how information can be integrated into a coherent
representation (John, 2001; Singer, 2001). In order to solve this ‘‘binding problem,’’ it has been suggested that
appropriate synchronization among cortical systems may be one of the necessary conditions for the buildup of
perceptual states and conscious awareness. By extension, Haggard et al. (2002) suggested that this synchronization
process could make possible causal judgments about actions, by creating a temporal binding between the initial
intention and the action.
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by a ‘‘prior intention’’ independent of the execution, they are also continuously represented in
the ‘‘intention in action’’ till the end of the action by integrating internal and external changes
(Searle, 1983). The sense of agency is not the experience of an act of will distinct from bodily
movements; it is the experience of the ‘‘on line’’ control of action execution. Therefore, we have
to distinguish between two aspects: I am the cause of the initiation of the action and I am the
cause of the way the action is achieved. In the former case, I am able to say ‘‘I move’’ inde-
pendently of the speciﬁc movement executed, while in the latter case, I am able to say ‘‘this is
my movement,’’ recognizing the speciﬁc parameters of the performed action. This conceptual
analysis does not result only from armchair speculations and philosophical ruminations, but
also from empirical dissociations found in neuropsychology: Anosognosic patients display a
disruption of the sense of initiation, while deaﬀerented patients suﬀer from a deﬁcit of the sense
of ones own movements. For instance, anosognosic patients believe that they have raised their
hand while actually they are unable to make any movement because of their paralysis (Fein-
berg, 2001, p. 23):
Feinberg: Now raise you left arm please. [No movement, no response; left hand remains
paralyzed on the bed, on the patients left side].
Feinberg: Where is your left arm now?
Rodney: Up in the air.
Feinberg: Its up in the air? How high is it now about?
Rodney: Not too high.
Feinberg: Not too high? [Patient is asked to point to his left arm. With his right hand he points
two and a half feet above the bed]. Okay, good put your right arm down, now. Put your left
arm down. Now, where is your left arm? [Patient points to his left arm on the bed].
According to Heilman, Barrett, and Adair (1998), anosognosic patients do not even try to
initiate any action and thus, they do not send any eﬀerence copy that could be compared to
sensory feedback and that would inform them that the intended movement has not been
performed. Gold, Adair, Jacobs, and Heilman (1994) showed indeed a hypoactivity of pre-
motor processing linked to a loss of motor intentions in anosognosia. Subjects were required
to squeeze a dynamometer with each hand. When the patient suﬀering from anosognosia
squeezed with his normal hand, both the right and the left pectoralis contracted. But when
asked to squeeze with the contralesional hand, he did not contract either pectoralis muscle.
Therefore, even if the movement—or at least the required muscle contractions—could still be
triggered automatically, the patient was no longer able to voluntarily initiate a movement.
However, he was not conscious of this deﬁcit and felt as if he were really initiating the
movement when he wanted. We can thus conclude that anosognosia is associated to the
disruption of the sense of initiation. On the contrary, the sense of initiation is preserved in
deaﬀerented patients, but not the sense of ones own movements. For instance, following a
neuropathy G.L. has been deaﬀerented below the mouth, that is, she does not receive any
tactile and proprioceptive information on her body: if she closes her eyes, she does not know
her bodily position and she has learnt to visually control her movements (Cole & Paillard,
1995). In a recent study with this patient using the alien hand task, Farrer et al. (personal
communication) also revealed that she self-attributed visually presented movements even if the
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did not pretend to have moved while she did not, like anosognosic patients, nor did she make
the same movement twice believing that she had not moved yet. Therefore, the sense of
initiation is preserved whereas the sense of ones own movements is impaired. In summary,
these two pathological phenomena tend to indicate that the sense of initiation and the sense of
ones own movements constitute two independent aspects of self-consciousness, which can be
speciﬁcally impaired.64.2. Back to Frith’s model
At a more operative level, we may speculate that these two kinds of sense of agency result
from diﬀerent cognitive mechanisms. Friths model of action monitoring assumes the existence
of diﬀerent comparators, which combine the intended state, the predicted state and the actual
state. Gallagher (2000) suggested applying the distinction between the sense of agency and the
sense of ownership on this model. Brieﬂy, he considered that I self-attribute a movement
either because I am the cause of the movement (sense of agency) or because I am the body
which is performing the movement (sense of ownership). In this conceptual framework, the
sense of agency—which is not analyzed into the sense of initiation and the sense of ones own
movements—depends solely on the comparison between the intention and the predicted state.
Therefore, the sense of agency would be disconnected from the actual execution of the
movement, independent from any sensory feedback. On the contrary, the sense of ownership
would result from the comparison between the predicted state and the sensory feedback.
However, such mechanism cannot give any account of the sense of ownership of ones own
body in passive movements: as there is no predicted state, the discrepancy with the sensory
feedback of the actual movement should lead the subject to deny the ownership of the
moving body. Furthermore, I do not need to move my body in order to recognize it as mine.
The sense of ownership of ones own body cannot thus be solely understood in terms of
action monitoring. It raises its own problems, independent from the question of action at-
tribution. Consequently, we suggest focusing only upon the sense of agency and its two
distinct aspects.
The sense of initiation of the action is prior to its execution and does not depend on any
sensory feedback. Indeed, Libet (1985) asked subjects to estimate the time at which they ini-
tiated a ﬁnger movement and showed that the reported time of action awareness anticipated the
actual starting time of the action by 80 ms. In other words, I am aware that I move before I
actually move. According to Frith et al. (2000), this judgement is related to the predicted state
of the system. Nonetheless, it does not mean that we are conscious of the content of the
predicted state, as if we were able to directly ‘‘read’’ the endogenous signal. Rather, only the
occurrence of the predicted state and the result of its comparison with the intended state are
available to awareness. Thats why we suggest that the matching between the intended and the
predicted states constitutes the basis of the experience of initiating the action and does not allow6 However, they do not illustrate a double dissociation. Indeed, we cannot determine the integrity of the sense of
ones own movements in anosognosia as no movement is actually performed.
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Gallagher (2000), we thus consider that the sense of agency is not exhausted by this ﬁrst kind of
comparison. The sense of agency is indeed not totally independent from sensory information. In
order to recognize the movement reﬂected by a mirror as mine, I need to compare what I see
with what I do. This kind of matching is also involved in the alien hand task and the fact that
G.L. was not able to identify her own movements demonstrates that we need proprioceptive
and visual information for the sense of ones own movements. Similarly, Blakemore et al. (1999)
emphasized the major role played by the sensory feedback in the sense of agency. Thus, the
comparison between the predicted state and the sensory feedback provides the sense of ones
own movements, rather than the sense of ownership.
4.3. Possible neural bases of the sense of agency
Finally, we may formulate some hypothesis about the possible neural bases of the sense of
agency. We have argued for the necessity of the ‘‘Who’’ system from the existence of neural
overlapping during action observation and action execution. However, the overlap is only partial
and some speciﬁc areas are activated solely for self-produced actions. Therefore, Georgieﬀ and
Jeannerod (1998) postulated that the activation of non-overlapping areas allows distinguishing
between ones own actions and someone elses actions. Recent data suggest indeed that action
attribution involves the activation of a vast cortical network including the prefrontal and the
parietal cortex, the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the cerebellum (Decety & Grezes, 1999;
Grezes & Decety, 2001; Vogeley & Fink, 2003).
Fink et al. (1999) using a mirror device to manipulate the visual feedback of the executed
movements showed a speciﬁc activation in the right dorsololateral prefrontal cortex when a
conscious conﬂict was generated between intention and the perceptual consequences. In its
unique capability of integrating external and internal data, the prefrontal cortex appears to be
an essential component of the neural implementation of the intended state. The cerebellar-
parietal network seems also to play a key role in the neural mechanisms underlying agency
judgements. Farrer et al. (2003) revealed that in the alien hand task, the degree of discrepancy
between the performed movement and the visually presented movement modulated the activity
of the anterior insula and the inferior part of the parietal lobe, speciﬁcally on the right side. In
accord with previous studies (Farrer & Frith, 2002), the results showed that being aware of
causing an action was associated with a greater activation in the anterior insula, whereas at-
tributing the action to another person was associated with a greater activation in the inferior
parietal cortex. Similarly, Ruby and Decety (2001) reported that the simulation of action from
third-person perspective recruited right inferior parietal when compared to the simulation from
a ﬁrst-person perspective. They thus suggested that the right inferior parietal lobe as well as in
precuneus and somatosensory cortex are involved in action attribution. Furthermore, when
hypnosis was used to induce action misattributions in normal subjects, movements attributed to7 One may wonder whether the existence of the ‘‘Who’’ system does not lead to an inﬁnite regress. For instance, in
order to know whether this action is mine I would need ﬁrst to determine that the intended state is mine. This problem
indeed arises only if we consider that mental states, such as intentions, also need to be self-attributed, as Frith (1992)
sustained. We assume here that self-attribution of intentions cannot be understood in terms of eﬀerence copies.
Fig. 2. Self-attribution of action. A body in movement may arise diﬀerent kinds of I-thoughts: (i) ‘‘my body is moving,’’
that is, the sense of ownership that results from the consciousness of oneself as the owner of the body in movement; (ii)
‘‘I move,’’ that is, the consciousness of oneself as the cause of the action initiation; (iii) ‘‘this is my movement,’’ that is,
the consciousness of oneself as the cause of the speciﬁc parameters of the movement. However, self-attribution of action
derives only indirectly from the sense of ownership, which is a matter of body recognition, rather than action recog-
nition. On the contrary, the sense of inititation and the sense of ones own movements may be related to the underlying
action monitoring. Yet, we should not preclude the inﬂuence of higher levels information such as the context and the
subjects beliefs.
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cerebellum, than movements correctly self-attributed (Blakemore, Oakley, & Frith, 2003).
Consistently, schizophrenic patients suﬀering from delusions of control revealed an overacti-
vation of the right parietal cortex (Spence et al., 1997). Moreover, the Schneiderian score of
eighty-seven patients (including delusion of thought insertion, auditory-verbal hallucinations,
delusion of reference and delusion of control) was positively correlated with the regional ce-
rebral blood ﬂow (rCBF) in the right superior parietal cortex and negatively correlated with the
rCBF in the left posterior cingulate gyrus and in the left lingual gyrus (Franck, OLeary, Flaum,
Hichwa, & Andreasen, 2002).
Consequently, we may postulate that the sense of initiation derives from the interaction
between the anterior brain regions (prefrontal cortex), the posterior ones (speciﬁcally the parietal
cortex) and the cerebellum, whereas the sense of ones own movement would involve the parietal
cortex and the cerebellum, as neural comparators, and the perceptual areas (see Fig. 2).5. Bottom-up and top-down interpretations of agency
In summary, the double sense of agency depends on the same mechanisms as action control: it
results from the unconscious comparison between diﬀerent kinds of aﬀerent and eﬀerent signals.
Therefore, these monitoring systems allow one to automatically distinguish ones own actions and
those of the other. For example, ocular movements are systematically attributed independently of
the awareness of these movements. Thus, on the one hand, action attribution does not use con-
scious information about action and on the other hand, it is systematic even in complete lack of
action awareness: unconscious actions are not anonymous. As Russell (1996, p. 263) said:
8 W
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tween self-determined and world-determined changes in input. It can give rise to a mode
of experience (the experience of being the cause of altered inputs and the experience of
being in control), but it is not itself a mode of experience.This unconscious label is prior to the sense of agency. However, can we reduce the latter to the
former? In other words, does the sense of agency reﬂect the awareness of the automatic label or
does it integrate other kinds of information?
Even if the sense of agency arises through the process of unconscious motor representations,
some higher-order information may interfere, like the context and the subjects reasoning pro-
cessing. According to Stephens and Graham (2000), self-attribution results from the intentional
stance and corresponds to the integration of the mental and bodily states in the narrative ﬁction
that were constructing about ourselves. They interpreted auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia
as the loss of the sense of the unity of the self. In other words, the content of what the ‘‘voice’’ says
does not ﬁt with the story about the subject and thus is projected to an external agent. Similarly,
Wegner (2002) described several ‘‘paranormal’’ phenomena such as automatic writing and spirit
possession that may be interpreted as high-level misattribution of action. He also reported the
eﬀect of subliminal presentation of the word ‘‘I’’ or ‘‘me’’ on judgments of authorship. Subjects
were required to judge letter strings to be words or not and the screen went blank after each trial
either because subjects replied correctly or the computer did it; then they were asked who did it.
On trials with subliminal priming, they tended to self-attribute the ambiguous action. These ex-
amples reveal that we can infer that we are not the agents of our own actions at higher cognitive
levels, while there is no deﬁcit at the subpersonal level of action monitoring.8 We may also
imagine the reverse: If the automatic action attribution does not work, the motor system refers the
action to another agent at the subpersonal level; but at the conscious level, I may believe that I am
the agent of that action, because I take into account the fact that I am alone. Thus, we can
consciously recognize actions as our own without self-attributing them at the subpersonal level
and vice-versa. We may even imagine that both levels are disrupted. For instance, Langdon and
Coltheart (2000) argued that aberrant perceptual experiences do not suﬃce to explain delusions,
such as schizophrenic ones, and that we need to postulate an additional deﬁcit at the level of the
rational evaluation of ones own beliefs. Consequently, we have to take into account diﬀerent
levels of self-consciousness, which can be reduced neither to subpersonal mechanisms of action
monitoring, nor to the result of inferences and beliefs.6. Conclusion
It seems that I am immediately aware that I am moving and that the sense of agency derives
directly from the consciousness of actions. However, this is a phenomenological illusion. The
sense of agency relies on a prior diﬀerentiation between oneself and the other. This distinctionegner (2002) seems to take into account only this hypothesis and considers that we always need to ‘‘infer’’ that
e the cause of our own actions.
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frame of reference of shared representations between self and others. The sense of agency must
be considered as a functional level distinct from the mechanisms of action control and action
awareness. The questions concerning the nature of the links unifying these three levels and their
implications in the construction of the self are still open. We do not pretend to provide here the
key of self-consciousness. Nevertheless, the diﬀerent theoretical and empirical approaches that
we presented have allowed us to shed a new light on the model of agency proposed by Frith
and collaborators, as well as to reﬁne the notion of the sense of agency itself. The empirical
studies of the relationship between perception of action and self-awareness are fundamental:
they contribute to the understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the notion of
agency and their possible disruptions, while stimulating and renewing the philosophical re-
ﬂection about the self.Acknowledgments
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